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measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms... whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 199
The Court, however, did go on to clarify that this standard was
merely a guide, in that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by the defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant."200

Although New York has not adopted the "reasonable
competence" standard articulated in Strickland, the courts do
require a similar standard. Taking each case into consideration
for its uniqueness, the New York courts look at the totality of
circumstances to determine whether counsel provided
"meaningful representation. "201

SECOND DEPARTMENT

People v. DeFreitas 202
(decided Aug. 14, 1995)
Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
arguing that his attorney failed to request a charge of a lesserincluded offense, failed to request that a Huntley hearing be
reopened and failed to assert that defendant had been
"framed." 203 The defendant asserted that the inaction of his
attorney amounted to a denial of his rights under the Federal 204
199. Id.
200. Id. at 688-89 (holding that there is a "strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance").
201. People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405, 444
N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1981).
202. 213 A.D.2d 96, 630 N.Y.S.2d 755 (2d Dep't 1995).
203. Id.

204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the assistance of counsel for
his defence." Id.; see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (holding that
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and State20 5 Constitutions. 206 On appeal, the Appellate Division,
Second Department affirmed the lower court's decision and held
207
that defendant had been provided meaningful representation.
The defendant had been arrested following a police chase
which began after he was interrupted, during the armed robbery
of a jewelry store, by two uniformed police officers who
appeared in response to the store's silent alarm. 20 8 The defendant
attempted to shoot one of the officers at point blank range when
they arrived. 209 The defendant's gun, however, failed to
discharge. 2 10 Taking the store owner and an employee as
hostages and using them as a shield, the defendant commandeered
an automobile and sped away. 2 11 In his attempt to escape,
defendant crashed into a stopped car, then fled on foot. 2 12 One of
the officers caught the defendant, who surrendered after dropping
214
a gun clip. 2 13 The gun was discovered in the car.
The court noted that "[f]rom the moment he spotted the
defendant, until he arrested him, the police officer never lost
sight of the defendant." 2 15 Furthermore, the jewelry store's
business card was found in the defendant's possession, and
diamonds were found in the defendant's pants pocket. 2 16 In
addition, the victims from the store identified the defendant
immediately. 2 17 Moreover, the crime scene unit found an
"unfired live round that displayed a light hit, i.e., a slight
the right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment includes effective
assistance of counsel).
205. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel .... " Id.
206. DeFreitas,213 A.D.2d at 98, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
207. Id. at 97-102, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 757-60.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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depression on its primer, which, according to firearms testimony,
indicated that it had been in a weapon that had its trigger pulled
but did not fire that bullet." 2 18
The defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel when his trial attorney had failed "to request a charge of
attempted assault in the second degree as a lesser-included
offense of attempted murder in the first degree," was quickly
dismissed. 2 19 In the lower court, it was established that from a
close distance, defendant had pointed a pistol directly at the
police officer's chest and pulled the trigger. 220 Therefore, the
court determined that "the failure of the defense counsel to ask
for the lesser-included charge [did] not amount to an absence of
meaningful representation," because it was clear from the
evidence that the lesser charge would not have been
supportable. 2

21

Without elaboration, the appellate division also found that there
had been no ineffective assistance of counsel in defendant's
attorney's decision to forego a Huntley hearing2 2 2 regarding the
voluntariness of a statement made by the defendant which
concerned his age. 223 The lower court determined that the
defendant's statement was made voluntarily and, therefore, was
admissible. 224

218. Id.

219. Id.
220. Id.

221. Id. (citing People v. Burke, 73 A.D.2d 627, 628, 422 N.Y.S.2d 469,
470-71 (2d Dep't 1979) (holding that a defendant who had fired his gun from
short range at police during a chase had, by that conduct, shown his intent to
bring about death rather than serious injury and, therefore, the lower court
properly refused the request for an instruction on a lesser-included offense)).
222. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838

(1965) (holding that in criminal trials, a judge must hold a preliminary hearing
and determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession made by a
defendant was voluntary, in order for the confession to be revealed to the jury
at trial).
223. Defreitas, 213 A.D.2d at 98, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
224. Id.
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As for defendant's claim that his counsel "never asserted that
the wrong man was arrested," '22 5 the court found that the
advancement of such a hypothesis would have been implausible
and prejudicial to the defendant because "the proof of the
defendant's involvement was overwhelming." ' 226 Explaining the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court cited Strickland v.
Washington.227 Strickland provides the federal test to be used by
courts when determining whether counsel rendered "reasonably
effective assistance." ' 228 Strickland sets forth a two-prong test
used to determine whether a counsel's errors violated an
229
individual's constitutional right to effective counsel.
To satisfy the first prong, the defendant must show that his
counsel's representation failed to provide him with reasonably
effective assistance. 230 Moreover, the counsel's errors must be so
serious as to lead the court to conclude that defendant's
representation was not functionally equivalent to that which is
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. 23 1 The second prong of
the Strickland test is satisfied when the defendant shows that he
was prejudiced in that there was a "reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors the results of the
proceeding would have been different."' 232 The Strickland court
explained that "[a] reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. '' 233 The
Strickland Court emphasized that a defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel would fail if either of the two
234
prongs were not shown by the defendant.

225. Id.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 687.
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The New York test for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel is found in People v. Baldi.235 In Baldi, the New York
Court of Appeals set forth the test stating that "[s]o long as the
evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case,
viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal
that the attorney provided meaningfid representation, the
236
constitutional requirement will have been met."
Applying this test to the case at bar, the DeFreitascourt noted
that the New York test of "requiring meaningful representation [is] a more searching inquiry than the farce and mockery [of
justice] standard," which had previously been the standard used
by New York courts to indicate a constitutional deprivation based
on counsel's performance. 237 Further, the DeFreitascourt stated
when "weighing constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in criminal cases, the courts have considered and have
invoked ethical standards recognizing ... [not only] the interests
of the defendants, but the credibility of the system, its integrity
" 2 38
and the institutional interests in... just verdicts.
In addition, the court quoted the following from the American
Bar Association ethical standards:
It is fundamental that defense counsel must be scrupulously
candid and truthful in representations in any matter before a
court. This is not only a basic ethical requirement but it is
essential if the lawyer is to be effective in the role of advocate,
for if the lawyer's reputation for veracity is suspect, he or she

235. 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146-47, 429 N.E.2d 400, 403-04, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893,
897-98 (1981).
236. Id. at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (emphasis added).
237. DeFreitas,213 A.D.2d at 98-99, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
238. Id. at 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (affirming a district court decision where the court had

declined a criminal defendant's proposed substitution of counsel in regard to
joint representation and noting that the lower court had not abused its

discretion in a case which had required complex litigation and where it had
been necessary to regulate multiple representation despite a possible conflict of
interest resulting from joint representation)).
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will lack the confidence of the court when it is needed most to
239
serve the client.
With regard to defendant's claim that his counsel had failed to
assert that defendant was the "wrong man" (i.e., that he had been
"framed"), the DeFreitas court stated that "counsel may be

reasonably expected to call upon witnesses to testify on behalf of
a defendant only when such witnesses exist. "240
Furthermore, the court explained that "it has been made clear

that the defense counsel's obligation to pursue a particular
contention or avenue of defense contemplates that the claim be
colorable. "241 Moreover, "there is no constitutional or statutory

right of a defendant to an attorney who will initiate a fabricated
defense. " 24 2 Simply put, the "Sixth Amendment does not require
that counsel do what is unethical or impossible," ' 2 4 3 and counsel

need not create nonexistent defenses that will ultimately "disserve
the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade.,"244

Moreover, the DeFreitas court observed that the basis for
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was,
239. Id. at 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, 124

(3d ed. 1993)). The court also cited ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 7-106(C)(1), and other ethical requirements which require
that an attorney not knowingly make false statements or statements for which
there is no reasonable basis. Id. at 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
240. Id. at 100-01, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing People v. Aiken, 45
N.Y.2d 394, 399, 380 N.E.2d 272, 275, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444, 448 (1978)
(stating that "the wisdom of counsel's decision can provide no basis for
appellant's claim that he was denied effective counsel")).
241. Id. at 101, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing People v. Garcia, 75 N.Y.2d
973, 555 N.E.2d 902, 556 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1978) (holding that defendant's trial
attorney "offered sound reasons for not challenging [defendant's] arrest" and
thus defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed)).
242. Id. at 101, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
243. Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984)
(holding that even where counsel has made demonstrable errors, a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment has been
satisfied where there has been a "meaningful adversarial" confrontation
between the defense and prosecution)).
244. DeFreitas, 213 A.D.2d at 101, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing Cronic,
466 U.S. at 657).
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inter alia, that his counsel had failed to claim that defendant had
been "framed," was an unbelievable theory and could have
worked against his defense. 245 According to the court, counsel
was not required to "cast aside the intelligence of the jury, and in
the name of advocacy, and despite its incompatibility with
established ethical standards, advance or fabricate any theory,
246
however false or specious it may be."
In this case, the comparison of the federal and state rationales
for determining ineffective assistance of counsel indicates that
any differences between the two is transparent. 24 7 As the court of
appeals has stated:
To be sure, we have developed a somewhat different test for
ineffective assistance of counsel under art. I, sec. 6 of the New
York Constitution from that employed by the Supreme Court in
applying the Sixth Amendment .... Nonetheless, the basic
purposes and constitutional interests at stake under both
constitutional guarantees of an adequate legal defense in a
criminal case are the same: the preservation of our unique
adversarial system of criminal justice, the underlying
presupposition of which "is that partisan advocacy on both sides
of the case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty
be convicted and the innocent go free." 24 8
Finally, there is no practical difference between the Federal
and New York State Constitutions involving claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel that are premised on counsel's failure to
assert implausible arguments. As stated by the Appellate
Division, Second Department, counsel is certainly not required to
set forth "baseless, spurious, or unethical" assertions or defenses
to fulfill the standard of meaningful representation. 249
245. Id. at 100, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 758.

246. Id. at 100, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
247. Id. at 99, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (citing People v. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d
76, 80, 629 N.E.2d 384, 386, 607 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (1993) (comparing

federal and state precedent and stating that the right to effective assistance of
counsel does not begin until "adversarial" proceedings have commenced)).
248. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d at 79, 629 N.E.2d at 385-86, 607 N.Y.S.2d at
914 (citation omitted).
249. DeFreitas,213 A.D.2d at 97, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
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